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By Paolo Palladino* 9UESTIONS about the stereochemistry of life processes provided the grounds for a fascinating and protracted debate over mechanist and vitalist anations of organic phenomena during the second half of the nineteenth century. Chemists discovered that many molecules come in alternative structural arrangements that are not superposable on their mirror images; the relationship is identical to that between a right and left hand. The physical and chemical properties of the alternative forms, the enantiomers, were believed to be identical in all respects except the three-dimensional arrangement of their component atoms., solution by appealing to the intervention of an extraphysical agent, God. Others sought mechanistic explanations, presupposing the existence of yet undiscovered asymmetric physical agents that could induce an asymmetric reaction. A third option that found readier acceptance among scientists in the aftermath of the Darwinian revolution was to suggest that the evolution of biochemical stereoselection was in large part a matter of history. I will discuss these alternatives in detail, bringing into relief the philosophical assumptions that guided scientists' endeavors to understand the origin of this peculiarity of biological chemistry. It is my contention that this late nineteenth-century debate over vitalist, mechanist, and evolutionary accounts was, at bottom, a debate over the role of chance and contingency in shaping the world about us.
In the course of articulating this thesis, I will touch upon a wide range of issues. Any attempt to treat as separate the various philosophical concerns that underlay this debate would result in an unintelligible compilation of disjointed statements about the origin of biochemical stereoselection. Indeed, I suggest that the beauty of this episode lies in the very range and complexity of the issues raised by the participants in the debate.
I. PASTEUR: VITALIST, MECHANIST, OR NEITHER?
The episode begins with Louis Pasteur's investigations of the connections between organic chemistry and optical activity.2 It was Pasteur who first realized that only living organisms could differentiate one optically active compound from its mirror image, and in so doing, he set out the crucial issues with which this essay is concerned.3
In the late 1840s Pasteur conducted a series of investigations of chemical isomerism, focusing his attention on the peculiarities of tartaric acid. With some difficulty, the crystals of this acid could be separated by sight into two distinct types, which were mirror images of one another. When the separated groups of crystals were redissolved, the resulting two solutions, which were absolutely identical from a chemical standpoint, deflected a beam of polarized light in opposite directions. Hence Pasteur argued that the deflection of polarized light had to be a property intrinsic to the molecular structure of the isomers.
Pasteur spent years trying to devise-chemical methods for the separation of the 2 The difference between the enantiomeric compounds is revealed only through their interaction with polarized light; when a polarized light beam is projected through a solution of one enantiomer it is deflected in the direction opposite to that imparted by the other enantiomer. In this essay, the terms optical isomers and optical activity will be used to refer to the objects of this interaction and the interaction itself. The term organic will be used loosely, equating organic products and those produced in biochemical processes.
3 There is an extensive secondary literature on much of Pasteur's work and on his philosophy of science. John Farley and Gerald Geison's joint article on Pasteur's work on spontaneous generation is now considered a classic study of the impact of social events on the articulation of scientific discourse: see our purposes, however, is Byk's optimistic reductionist outlook, typical of an earlier generation of German scientists and of several of the actors in this story.7
Another problem with Byk's assessment is that Pasteur's demarcation between vital and inorganic chemistry was intended to be descriptive rather than prescriptive. This point was not lost on everyone. zenberger argued that Pasteur's proposed division between organic and inorganic nature was a well-supported but temporary assessment of the current state of knowledge. Schutzenberger was certainly not a vitalist, and his comments on vital forces clearly reflect his materialist outlook. He firmly believed that "there is really no chemical vital force. If living cells produce reactions which seem peculiar to themselves, it is because they realize conditions of molecular mechanism which we have not hitherto succeeded in tracing, but which we shall, without doubt be able to discover at some future time."8 Although Pasteur was quite opposed to such intransigent materialism, his willingness to accept a demarcation between vital and inorganic chemistry should not be interpreted as motivated by vitalism. Rather, it was a reflection of his intransigent positivism.9 In 1875, he argued that the distinction he had drawn between vital and inorganic chemical processes was "based on fact and not on principle.... [N]ot only do I not believe that this barrier between the mineral and organic kingdoms is infrangible, but I have determined the experimental conditions proper, I think, to make this barrier disappear. Since these conditions have not been successfully realized, it is wise to believe the distinction we are dealing with, and take it as a guidelin
In the next section I will consider the imaginative experiments Pasteur undertook to resolve this problem. These exemplify the approach pursued by physical scientists aiming to provide an answer to a most troubling question.
II. THE PHYSICISTS
To those scientists who rejected any prescriptive distinction between organic and inorganic nature, it seemed that the production of optically active substances in the laboratory would erase the demarcation perceived by Pasteur, and that it would bring them a step closer to the unification of these two realms of nature.
Pasteur himself was a pioneer in the pursuit of this goal. It was obvious to him that, if chemical syntheses were to yield asymmetric products, then asymmetric agents had to be brought into play. In the course of his 1860 lecture he asked: "Is it not necessary and sufficient to admit that at the moment of elaboration of the primary principles in the vegetable organism, an asymmetric force is present?
... Do these asymmetric actions ... reside in light, in electricity, in magnetism, or in heat? Can they be related to the motion of the earth, or to the electric currents by which physicists explain the terrestrial magnetic poles?"11 At this time Pasteur did not reveal that he had already undertaken experiments aimed at bringing such asymmetric forces to bear on synthetic processes. Only in 1884 did he admit that "in Strasbourg I had already asked Ruhmkorff to build some powerful magnets; in Lille, I turned to rotating mechanisms, guided by clockworks: I attempted to have a plant live from germination, under the influence of inverted solar rays with the aid of a mirror connected to a heliostat."112 This peculiar 8 Paul Schutzenberger, On Fermentation (New York: Appleton, 1882), pp. 5-8, emphasis added scheme was designed to affect photosynthesis by altering the polarity of solar radiation. Even Pasteur felt that, besides being quite ineffective, these approaches to the resolution of the question were not very orthodox.13 His mentor, Jean-Baptiste Biot, attempted to discourage him from pursuing this line of work on the grounds that it was fraught with considerable technical and theoretical difficulties. 14 Some years later Pierre Curie, a physicist whose disciplinary background, crystallography, was in the same field as Pasteur's, undertook an extensive mathematical analysis of symmetries. His views on symmetry included a priori beliefs as intuitively obvious to him as they had been to Pasteur and other crystallographers before him. Curie believed that "when certain causes produce certain effects, the elements of symmetry of the causes must be reflected in the effects produced. When certain effects reveal a certain dissymmetry, this dissymmetry must be found among the causes." 15 For Curie, as for Pasteur, symmetric forces would yield only symmetric results, and thus asymmetric outcomes could not result from the action of symmetric forces. In 1894 Curie extended his analysis of symmetry to electric and magnetic fields, and in so doing he pointed out that some of the forces considered by Pasteur to be asymmetric were in fact symmetric. Based on theoretical considerations alone, Pasteur's work was therefore bound to be fruitless. However, Curie also demonstrated that there were a small number of physical interactions that possessed those characteristics required to affect the symmetric course of chemical reactions. According to him, the superposition of electric and magnetic fields, light rays propagated in parallel to a magnetic field, or circularly polarized electromagnetic radiation were all superpositions of symmetric physical agents that could be included in the group of potentially effective agents.16 Specifically, he cited the Wiedemann effect as an electromagnetic effect that could induce an asymmetric course of reaction, leading to optically active products without violating any conditions of symmetry.17
During the next few years, a few physical chemists attempted to elucidate Curie's notion of asymmetric photochemical action, bringing their more detailed arguments to bear on the origins of optical activity. In 1896 the French chemist Aime Cotton observed that certain optically active substances showed abnormal optical dispersion when exposed to plane-polarized light whose wavelength corresponded to the absorption bands peculiar to the substances in question; this abnormality is now known as the Cotton effect. Cotton suggested that this effect could be linked to a hypothetical photodegradative process based on circularly polarized light, and possibly, given the right conditions, it could lead to a "stereoselective degradation," the preferential degradation of one of the two enantiomers. He proposed the following: "Suppose having a mixture formed of two positions around the central atom. If two of the four substituents were identical, then the arrangement was bilaterally symmetric; if they were unlike one another, then there existed two arrangements that were identical and not superposable.
The addition of the first three unlike substituents to the tetravalent central atom defined a geometric plane; the addition of the last substituent on either side of the plane defined two structures that were mirror images of one another. In an environment devoid of any physical asymmetry, the physical forces governing the addition of the last substituent would not favor the formation of either structure.
Either form was equally probable, and as the number of molecules undergoing addition tended to infinity, the ratio between the two forms would approach unity. Thus, argued Le Bel and van't Hoff, all such substitution or addition reactions should yield racemic products.25
There was obviously an incongruity between Le Bel's and van't Hoff s theoretical arguments and Jungfleisch's experimental accomplishment, but this tension failed to arouse anyone's interest until a "metaphysically" inclined chemist approached the subject of the asymmetric chemistry of life from a radically different perspective. Delivered by the British chemist Francis Japp, the address was entitled "Stereochemistry and Vitalism." After having described the recent advances in stereochemistry, and the recent but still unsuccessful efforts to obtain absolute asymmetric syntheses, Japp asked "whether the phenomena of life are wholly explicable in terms of chemistry and physics." His own solution, he hoped, would contribute to the revival of the doctrine of vitalism that was then taking place among biologically oriented scientists. He presented his aims in the following terms:
Recent years have . . . witnessed a significant revival of the doctrine of vitalism among the physiologists of the younger generation.
It is not my intention to offer any opinion on the various arguments which physiologists of the neo-vitalistic school have put forward in support of their views; these arguments and the facts on which they are based lie outside my province.... I shall endeavour to show that living matter is constantly performing a certain geometrical feat which dead matter, unless indeed it happens to belong to a particular class of products of the living organism and to be ultimately referable to living matter, is incapable-not even conceivably capable-of performing. My argument, being based on geometrical and dynamical considerations, will have the advantage, over the physiological arguments, of immeasurably greater simplicity.26
It may seem strange that a chemist whose claim to fame rested on his work on the stereochemistry of inorganic compounds should choose to defend a type of scientific explanation that was quite unfashionable among most chemists of the time. However, there were a few exceptions among the physiological chemists, and Japp's association with Alexander Crum Brown may explain his interest.27 Crum Brown's reputation rested on his important contributions to both physiology and structural chemistry, and as is noted below, he had already expressed some interesting views on the issue at hand.28
Japp's lecture continued with the following assessment of vital chemistry: Non-living symmetrical matter-the matter of which the inorganic world is composed of-interacting under the influence of symmetric forces to form asymmetric compounds, always yields either pairs of enantiomorphous molecules (racemoid form), or pairs of enantiomorphous groups united within the molecule (meso-form), the result being, in either case, mutual compensation and consequent optical inactivity. The same will hold good of symmetric matter interacting under the influence of asymmetric forces (supposing that such forces exist) provided that the latter are left to produce their effect under conditions of pure chance.
If these conclusions are correct, as I believe they are, then the absolute origin of the compounds of one-sided asymmetry to be found in the living world is a mystery as profound as the absolute origin of life. The two phenomena are intimately connected for, as we have seen, these symmetric compounds make their appearance with life, and are inseparable from it.
How, for example, could laevo-rotatory protein (or whatever the first asymmetric compound may have been) be spontaneously generated in a world of symmetric matter and of forces which are either symmetric or, if asymmetric, are asymmetric in two opposite senses? What mechanism could account for such selective production? Or if, on the other hand, we suppose that dextro-and laevo-protein were simultaneously formed, what conditions of environment existing in such a world could account for the survival of the one form and the disappearance of the other? Natural selection leaves us in the lurch here; for selective consumption is, under these conditions, as inconceivable as selective production.
No fortuitous concourse of atoms, even with all eternity for them to clash and combine in, could compass this feat of the formation of the first optically active organic compound. Coincidence is excluded, and every purely mechanical explanation of the phenomenon must necessarily fail. I see no escape from the conclusion that, at the moment when life first arose, a directive force came into play-a force of precisely the same character as that which enables the intelligent operator, by the exercise of his Will, to select one crystallised enantiomorph and reject its asymmetric opposite.29
A writer for the London Times dismissed Japp's argument, referring to "the national tendency of a Scot towards a metaphysical conception of Nature."30 Japp's position could not so easily be discounted as merely "metaphysical,"
however.
The last passage from the above quotation expresses Japp's belief that, at the 27 For Japp's interest see Japp, "Stereochemistry and Vitalism," p. 28 D. C. Goodman, "Brown, Alexander Crum" into which only one key could be fitted; the asymmetry of the chlorophyllic unit determined the asymmetry of the product of photosynthesis. Fischer asked, in conclusion: "Is the preparation of optically active substances a prerogative of the living organism; is a special cause, a kind of vital force, at work here? I do not think so, and incline rather to the view that it is only the imperfection of our knowledge which imports into this process the appearance of the miraculous."32
In his address, Japp quoted Fischer's conclusion and retorted that although the facts of microbial stereoselective consumption and enzymatic stereoselective chemistry might be taken as evidence in favour of Fischer's view . .. [w]hat I wish to point out is that Fischer's statement that the miraculous character of the phenomenon is eliminated by his assumption appears open to question. It is just as much, or as little, miraculous after as before. The production of a single asymmetric form, and the destruction of one of the opposite forms, are problems of precisely the same order of difficulty, and there are only two ways in which either of them has ever been solved: firstly, by the direct action of living matter, and secondly, by the use of previously existing asymmetric non-racemoid compounds, which are in last resort, due to the action of life. In this anachronistic defense of vitalism, Japp reveals a deep concern with the role of God in the origin and maintenance of the world, and I think we should view his argument not only as a contribution to the vitalist philosophy of his time but also as a response to the debates over the relationship between science and religion that had enflamed the Victorian scientific scene during the 1860s and 1870s.34
Deists and vitalists alike questioned the notion that mechanical, materialist philosophy could account for everything, especially human free will. In the late 1840s this position was severely undermined by Hermann von Helmholtz, who argued that the irreducible forces often invoked by vitalists and deists were at odds with the principle of the conservation of energy. Japp was well aware of this fundamental criticism of deistic and vitalist theories, and in order to defend his own thesis he relied on the most sophisticated response to Helmholtz's intransigent materialism-Fleeming Jenkin's essay "Lucretius and the Atomic Theory."35 Jenkin had argued that a force acting at right angles to the path of a material body performed no work, all the while continuously altering the direction in which the body moved. He then suggested that human free will should be understood as an agent analogous to such a perpendicular, directive force. The action of the will could then be classified among those active principles which could affect mechanical systems but could not themselves be determined by the laws of mechanics. Jenkin's argument left room for the action of the immaterial will in a completely deterministic world.
As was true for Jenkin's, Japp's deism and vitalism were in no way a repudiation of determinism. On the contrary, his universe was as deterministic as that of Helmholtz. Japp supposed, like most of his contemporaries, that like effects would proceed only from like causes in a completely symmetric and predictable fashion, and he, like the mechanists, had no choice but to recognize that "only Some of my hearers ... may think that, instead of rendering the subject clearer, I have brought it perilously near to the obscure region of metaphysics; and certainly, if to argue the insufficiency of the mechanical explanation of a phenomenon is to be metaphysical, I must plead guilty to the charge. I will, therefore, appeal to a judgment-metaphysical, it is true, but to be found in a very exact treatise on physical science-namely Newton's Principia. It has marked bearing on the subject in hand:
"A caeca necessitate metaphysica, quae utique eadem est semper et ubique, nulla oritur rerum variatio." [Blind metaphysical necessity, which is certainly the same always and everywhere, could produce no variety of things.]
I will merely add this is certainly true of the particular rerum variatio in which optically active organic compounds originate.37
Japp did not need to remind his well-versed audience of Newton's claim that "all that diversity of natural things [the rerum variatio] which we find suited to different times and places could arise from nothing but the ideas and will of a Being necessarily existing."38 These excerpts from Newton's Principia had been made famous by the 1717 debate between Gottfried Leibniz and Samuel Clarke, the latter acting as Newton's spokesman. Leibniz had invoked the principle of sufficient reason to argue against Clarke's and Newton's appeal to divine intervention in order to explain the origin of active principles such as gravity. But
Leibnitz's principle could hardly apply to Japp's problem, for it could not be argued that the property of stereoselection should be "so and not otherwise,"
quite the contrary.39 Japp, like Clarke before him, invoked the action of God to replace accident with deterministic order.
VI. JAPP'S CRITICS
Japp's address to the British Association was published in Nature, and soon thereafter a lively polemic over the origin of optical activity erupted in the pages of the magazine. As judged by the response, including that of some eminent personalities, Japp's address touched upon a sensitive issue. Herbert Spencer was one of the more famous, if ineffective, critics of Japp's thesis. He argued that there was a very simple solution to the problem:
Prof. Japp appears to have taken no account of a universal law displayed throughout that continuous redistribution of matter and motion which constitutes Evolution. In the second part of First Principles will be found a chapter entitled "Segregation" in which this law and its results are set forth.... The abstract propositions involved are these: -First, that like units, subject to a uniform force capable of producing motion in them, will be moved to like degrees in the same direction. Second, that like units if exposed to unlike forces capable of producing motion in them, will be differently moved-moved either in different directions or to different degrees in the same direction. Third, that unlike units if acted on by a uniform force capable of producing motion in them will be differently moved-moved either in different directions or to different degrees in the same direction.40
As Japp pointed out, Spencer failed to understand that, except for circularly polarized light, all physical forces interact indifferently with respect to the enantiomers; furthermore, Spencer was unable to specify how his "Law of Segregation" explained the observed peculiarity of living organisms. But Spencer had other grounds for criticizing Japp's approach. According to Spencer, discussions of the origin of life were merely metaphysical, since questions about origins were outside the realm of positive science.41 Spencer's opposition to discussions of origins may seem strange in view of his evolutionism; keep in mind, however, that his conception of "Evolution" was very mechanistic and deterministic. The initial germ of life was taken as a given; it was an active principle whose nature could not be investigated, and thereafter the "Law of Segregation" determined the progressive unfolding of its potentialities. Japp, however, was not prepared to accept such an account. Recall that in his address to the British Association, he had linked the origin of optical activity to the origin of life; and none of the participants in the Nature debate, except Errera, thought of separating the two problems. Thus from Japp's perspective, any appeal to a "play of chance" was tantamount to suggesting that life itself originated accidentally. Furthermore, picking up on FitzGerald's suggestion that life probably started from a single molecule, which could have been either dextro-or laevorotatory, Japp cleverly noted that if an accident of such momentous importance never repeated itself, how certain could one be that it was only an accident? What better evidence was there for arguing special origins? 44 C. 0. Bartrum, in Nature, 1898, 58:545; and Giorgio Errera, ibid., p. 616. For biographical information on Errera (1860-1933) see Poggendorffs (cit. n. 8), Vol. VIIb(2). It is interesting that Errera thought that the original asymmetric molecule that seeded the racemic solution and caused the biased crystallization was of extraterrestrial origin. This recourse to cosmic origins was characteristic of those nineteenth-century mechanists who were confronted with problems that defied mechanical explanation. Hermann von Helmholtz and Svante Arrhenius approached the problem of the origin of life in just such a manner, and Errera seems to have this in mind when he says: "Supposing molecular asymmetry to have come on to our planet from outward space (an origin ascribed by some to life) . Until this time, probabilistic arguments had been viewed as explicit admissions of ignorance or limited knowledge, attributable to human shortcomings. In 1873 Stanley Jevons epitomized this creed in his assertion that "there is really no such thing as chance, regarded as producing and governing events."48 Against this philosophical background, the appeal by Japp's critics to chance events to explain the observed peculiarity of vital processes could be viewed in one of two ways: either as a profession of ignorance about the ultimate cause of the phenomenon and hence as a refusal to meet Japp's challenge, or as an assertion that the present form of the world was not predictable from its initial conditions, that is, as an explicit acceptance of the notion that the world need not be just "so, and not otherwise." Given the constraints imposed by this philosophical framework, Japp could be only skeptical of any account in terms of statistical fluctuations; and in his longest and most detailed reply to his critics, he wrote: "All my critics arguments, albeit to varying degrees. Twenty years after Jevons, the views of the philosopher Paul Carus on the role of "chance" in the universe reflected -the evolution of a less dogmatic commitment to determinism. He wrote:
While absolute chance cannot be admitted, partly because we are not in need of it, since the irregularities of nature can be sufficiently explained otherwise, and partly because the idea of absolute chance if it were needed, is incompatible with our world conception, we shall, nevertheless, have to concede to chance, as we understand the term, a very important role in the evolution of life. The formation of worlds and the history of mankind depend to a great extent upon chances similar to the throws of dice. There are many possibilities, and now this, now that, will, according to the circumstances, be realized-of course in each case with strict necessity.... The conditions may vary, nay, so far as we can judge they actually do vary; and any apparently slight variation of them, or even one of them, will result in different effec of great consequence. Without a detailed knowledge of all these special conditions, simply from a supposed a priori knowledge of the world substance, the idiosyncracy of this or that particular solar system could not be a priori determined. Here it will be such, and there, under perhaps slightly different circumstances, it will be entirely other.
From this point of view we call these results product of chance.51
Carus was presenting a rather counterintuitive argument; he acknowledged that contingency, the determinant of "idiosyncracy," played a great role in the formation of the universe known to us, but he found no conflict between this view and a belief in determinism. This was the result of a subtle argument, in which he allowed room for explanations appealing to chance but not for complete descriptions of the world also appealing to chance. Probabilistic arguments continued to be viewed as admissions of limited knowledge, but the prevailing attitude toward such accounts was now far more ambiguous than at the time of Jevons's pronouncement. Charles Darwin's theory of evolution was perhaps the most striking example of the ambiguous relation between chance and determinism in late nineteenthcentury scientific discourse. This theory suggested that the organic forms currentlv found in nature were accidental outcomes of the evolutionary process. For causes to explain the origin, if not the perpetuation by natural selection, of these differences was not a denial of the mechanical causes underlying the differences in forms; he simply did not consider a discussion of these unknown causes of the origin of variation, which we would now call mutation, particularly relevant to understanding the evolution of a particular morph, and in this sense the differences were a matter of "chance."53 Ludwig Boltzmann's later appraisal of the Darwinian theory brings into relief the uneasy compromise between mechanism and chance sought by some late nineteenth-century scientists. Boltzmann, the scientist most responsible for the introduction of probabilistic arguments into physics, and at the same time the most adamant defender of mechanism, often praised Darwin's theory, the appeal to chance notwithstanding. He once remarked: "We ... have to remember that most wonderful mechanical theory in the field of the biological sciences, namely, the theory of Darwin. It undertakes to explain the whole diversity of the world of plants and animals through the purely mechanical principle of heredity-which admittedly in itself is dark like all the fundamental principles of mechanics."54 Boltzmann recognized that the mechanisms underlying the mutations upon which Darwin's theory was constructed were at the time obscure, yet not unknowable. The phenomena of mutation and heredity could not be investigated directly, but taken as givens they could be marshaled into a coherent account of the evolution of species. In this sense, an arbitrary given permitted the construction of a fruitful theory. Yet, according to Boltzmann, as long as the probabilistic analysis of the second law of thermodynamics could not be reduced to the "fundamental principles of mechanics," it remained an incomplete account of thermodynamic phenomena. Analogously, as long as the "principles of heredity" This conceptual framework was very influential in the development of an alternative argument to account for the evolution of the asymmetric chemistry of life. To some of the scientists involved in the Nature debate it seemed that a Darwinian account could provide a framework that would succeed where the mechanistic and vitalist accounts had seemed to fail. Scientists like FitzGerald proposed that the agency of "section" (selection) would somehow explain the evolution of this asymmetric chemistry from "accidental" beginnings. However, Japp questioned the meaning of such an appeal, pointing out that "several of my critics seem to think that a mere sensible preponderance of one enantiomorph is sufficient [to account for the phenomenon]. This is not the case unless the minority can be bred out of existence; and I do not think that under symmetrical conditions this is possible."55 He realized that the appeal to statistical fluctuations alone was rather ad hoc, and that it failed to explain how the occasional, accidental resolution of some primeval chemical solution could have resulted in the predominance of absolute stereoselection throughout the living world. Essentially, Japp presented his critics with a serious challenge: to provide the mechanistic component of the tentative Darwinian account of the origin of the asymmetric chemistry of life.
Pearson attempted to address this challenge, suggesting that accidental resolutions in the primeval environment could be of historical import because the accidentally generated molecules could act as breeders, "endowed with a power of selecting their own kind of asymmetry from other racemoid substances. "56 However, Japp quickly pointed out that this hypothetical breeder concept could not be justified in terms of current chemical knowledge. Pearson replied to this criticism, claiming that Japp speaks of the "vague and elastic" way in which I speak of the "breeding" process-I notice that Prof. Errera also uses the phrase "asymmetry begets asymmetry as life begets life." Let us confine the term then, for the present, simply to the process (of which so far the mechanism is unintelligible) by which chance having given a slight preponderance of one type of enantiomorph, a group of the same type, visible and touchable is formed there. It is perfectly conceivable that this is only a visible representation of the process by which living asymmetry selects like, even in a noncrystalline compound. It is only the mechanism which is vague, not the fact.S7
Just as it was used earlier in the century to ban deism from scientific discourse, here again intransigent positivism served to sweep aside another vexing problem confronting nineteenth-century scientists. However, it seems that even Pearson realized that his account was inadequate, because in his third and last contribu-tion to the Nature controversy he appealed to hypothetical asymmetric forces.58
The author of Japp's obituary was quite right, then, to claim that Japp had answered all his critics. As John Theodore Merz pointed out, the origin of the asymmetric chemistry of life was a difficult problem. Here "no mechanical by Japp, the challenge that Pearson had been unable to meet.
It was another of Japp's earlier critics who took up the problem where Pearson had left it, formulating a detailed historical account that incorporated chemistry, chance, and natural selection. In 1903, in a review of recent advances in stereochemistry, Pope argued that the problem at hand had been cloaked in mystery by the fact that the evolution of organisms constituted of optically active substances had resulted in an accentuated enantiomorphism "to such an extent that physiological chemistry is now almost entirely the chemistry of enantiomorphous substances."62 To account for this evolution, he argued that when life originated on earth, the primitive organic systems at first consumed both forms of some enantiomorphous nutritive substance. However, as the competition for the nutritive substrate intensified, these primitive organisms, in order to increase the efficiency of resource utilization, evolved highly tuned digestive apparata. This hypothesis was in agreement with the observations of Ulpiani and Condelli, who had specifically studied the correlation between phylogenetic relatedness and accuracy of stereoselection. Ultimately, some of the organisms developed such a high degree of stereospecificity that they could consume only the dextro-or the laevorotatory form of some optically active chemical nutrients. The question of the primeval origin of optically active substances has been reopened in a new way by A. Byk who recalls an old experiment of Jamin's, which indicates that terrestrial magnetism uses the partially plane polarized light reflected from such surfaces as that of the ocean to become partially circularly polarized. In the circularly polarized light thus produced, one component-say d-light-predominates on the earth's surface. Byk then confirms the observation of Cotton that d-circularly polarized light is differently absorbed by copper ammonium d-and l-tartrates. The preponderance of d-light on the earth's surface must therefore be more favorable to the persistence of one optically active component of racemic acid than the other. 65 Pope does not specify how Byk's work would resolve the problem, and thus this appeal to a hypothetical photochemical mechanism providing a relative abundance of one molecular form rather than the other is not significantly differ- Alfred Stewart's assessment of the Nature controversy suggests that in some way the photochemical mechanism filled an apparent lacuna in the historical account. In a review in 1908 of recent developments in stereochemistry, Stewart, a physiological chemist by training, dismissed all the arguments espoused in the controversy as merely theoretical and based on no empirical evidence. Even so, he suggested that the equally unsupported photochemical mechanism proposed by Byk settled the question. It is hard to understand why Byk's account was any better than explanations offered by the participants in the controversy, since they were all equally "theoretical arguments based on no experimental evidence. "66 But the replacement of the appeal to statistical fluctuations with this "new"9 mechanism changed Pope's original Darwinian account in a fundamental manner: it removed accident from the explanation and resulted in the predetermination of the outcome of the historical process; thus this historical account effectively ceased to be a Darwinian one. On the basis of these considerations, I
suggest that Pope perceived in Byk's proposition the possibility of explaining the intriguing development of the asymmetric chemistry of life without recourse to contingency. Viewed from this perspective, Pope's interest in the photochemical hypothesis was tantamount to a rejection of the claim made by Ulpiani and Condelli that historical and mechanical accounts were incommensurable. In the last analysis, Pope's position seems closer to that articulated by Boltzmann: at times historical accounts can be very useful, but at bottom they are incomplete and fail to predetermine natural phenomena. The history of the eel's migration to its ancestral spawning grounds was Russell's favorite case for the separation of what Ernst Mayr would later call "proximate" and "ultimate" explanations of biological phenomena.68 Russell admitted that eels may be guided in their migration by temperature gradients, and that the mechanics underlying their sense of direction could be reduced to physicochemical interactions; moreover, he even admitted that it would be possible to give a complete physicochemical description of an eel's swimming movements in some unspecified body of water. However, this mechanistic description would not differ in any way from a complete physicochemical description of an eel's movements while swimming toward its spawning grounds. The phenomena to be explained, motion in any body of water, and motion toward a specific destination, were distinct; yet the mechanistic analyses of the two phenomena were indifferent to this distinction. It was therefore obvious to Russell that the mechanistic approach could not answer the question, Why does the eel migrate to the ancestral spawning grounds? The physical and chemical approaches could potentially account for the how of the eel's migration, but not the why; the latter question called for an explanation in terms of the history of the species.
Of course, an intransigent determinist could reject this categorical distinction between historical and mechanistic accounts by describing the evolutionary process that led to the neural imprinting of the migratory behavior of eels in molecular terms. Yet such an account would require a complete molecular redescription of a long historical process and, to say the least, would quickly prove unmanageable. Nonetheless, this approach did not lack for advocates; it was no straw man.
In The inescapable similarities between Ulpiani's and Pierre Simon Laplace's views are quite apparent. It should be noticed that, to draw a distinction between God and Laplace's intelligent observer, who could predict the course of history given the laws of physics and the initial state of all the particles composing the universe, would be most difficult. Was there a real difference between vitalists like Japp and mechanists such as Ulpiani? The former invoked the action of God to answer an apparently intractable problem. The latter argued that, had he been as omniscient as God, he could have provided a true answer to the question of the origin of biochemical stereoselection. At this point it is worth recalling that
McPherson had criticized Japp's vitalist thesis because in his view it signaled the end of science; now the same could have been said of Ulpiani's approach, for scientific investigations are conducted by humans, not God.
XI. CONCLUSION
To return to the question about the origin of optical activity, the historical, evolutionary hypothesis did not defy symmetry restrictions or physical law and went some way toward an explanation of the origin of biological stereoselective chemistry. Furthermore, unlike the mechanist and vitalist alternatives, it could be substantiated by a fair amount of corroborating empirical evidence. Yet the hypothesis was viewed ambivalently. This situation cannot be attributed to the uncertain status of the Darwinian theory during the late nineteenth century alone. Since the mid-nineteenth century, no consensus on the origins of the asymmetric chemistry of life has been achieved, and contemporary chemists continue to argue that "the origin of optical activity presents problems to the hypothesis of chemical evolution that are at present insoluble. Is it not true that, bereft of all sense of decency and ethical restraints, both these miscreants then emptied on the rocks of lifeless Earth six barrels of gelatinous glue, rancid, plus two cans of albuminous paste, spoiled, and that to this ooze they added some curdled ribose, pentose, and levulose, and-as though that filth were not enough-they poured upon it three large jugs of a mildewed solution of amino acids, then stirred the seething swill with a coal shovel twisted to the left, and also used a poker, likewise bent in the same direction, as a consequence of which the proteins of all future organisms on Earth were LEFT-handed?!73
